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THE PRESERVATION OBLIGATION: 
REGULATING AND SANCTIONING PRE-




The issue of discovery misconduct, specifically as it pertains to the pre-
litigation duty to preserve and sanctions for spoliation, has garnered much 
attention in the wake of decisions by two prominent jurists whose voices 
carry great weight in this area.  In Pension Committee of University of 
Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities LLC,1 Judge Shira A. 
Scheindlin—of the Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC2  e-discovery cases—
penned a scholarly and thorough opinion setting forth her views regarding 
the triggering of the duty to preserve potentially relevant information 
pending litigation and the standards for determining the appropriate 
sanctions for various breaches of that duty.3  Not long afterwards, Judge 
Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Rules 
of Practice and Procedure (the Standing Committee) and former Chair of 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, issued an opinion in Rimkus 
Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata,4 describing her understanding of 
many of the same issues touched on in Pension Committee.5  Both of these 
opinions have come at a time when the legal community is looking for 
better and more consistent guidance regarding the preservation obligations 
attendant to prospective litigation in the federal courts.  Unfortunately, 
although other courts may draw some guidance from these two opinions, 
the fact is that variation among district courts and among the circuits will 
persist as long as policing pre-litigation preservation obligations remains 
largely the product of common law regulation via the inherent power of the 
courts.6
 
*  Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. Copyright © 2011 A. 
Benjamin Spencer. I would like to thank Washington & Lee for generous grant assistance 
that enabled this research.  I would also like to thank those who were able to give helpful 
comments on the piece, including Judge Shira Scheindlin, Professor Richard Marcus, and 
Thomas Allman. 
 
 1. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 2. 220 F.R.D. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 3. Pension Committee, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 463–72. 
 4. 688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 5. Id. at 611–20. 
 6. See infra text accompanying note 11. 
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Given this state of affairs, the time is ripe for a uniform federal approach 
to the pre-litigation duty to preserve and sanctions for spoliation.  After 
reviewing the existing frameworks for determining the duty to preserve and 
imposing sanctions that prevail among the federal courts, this Article 
explores how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) might be 
amended to define and enforce pre-action preservation obligations more 
effectively and consistently across jurisdictions. 
I.  THE PRE-LITIGATION PRESERVATION OBLIGATION 
A. The Duty To Preserve 
Although the duty to preserve evidence can arise from specific 
regulatory,7 statutory,8 or court-ordered9 admonitions to preserve 
documents or information,10
 
 7. For example, a particular regulation states: 
 the ordinary pre-litigation duty to preserve is a 
consequence of the inherent authority of courts to sanction parties who 
culpably permit the loss or destruction of relevant evidence prior to the 
  Any personnel or employment record made or kept by an employer (including 
but not necessarily limited to requests for reasonable accommodation, application 
forms submitted by applicants and other records having to do with hiring, 
promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off or termination, rates of pay or other terms of 
compensation, and selection for training or apprenticeship) shall be preserved by 
the employer for a period of one year from the date of the making of the record or 
the personnel action involved, whichever occurs later. 
29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1991). 
 8. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act provides as follows: 
During the pendency of any stay of discovery pursuant to this paragraph, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, any party to the action with actual notice of the 
allegations contained in the complaint shall treat all documents, data compilations 
(including electronically recorded or stored data), and tangible objects that are in 
the custody or control of such person and that are relevant to the allegations, as if 
they were the subject of a continuing request for production of documents from an 
opposing party under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(C)(i) (2006). 
 9. A federal district court may impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(Rule) 37(b) when a party spoliates evidence in violation of a court order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(b)(2). 
 10. See id. 37(f) advisory committee note (“A preservation obligation may arise from 
many sources, including common law, statutes, regulations, or a court order in the case.”).  
Some states also recognize a common law tort of spoliation: 
(1) A cause of action exists in tort for interference with or destruction of evidence; 
(2a) the elements of a claim for interference with or destruction of evidence are (1) 
pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff, (2) knowledge on the part of 
defendant that litigation exists or is probable, (3) willful destruction of evidence by 
defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s case, (4) disruption of the plaintiff’s 
case, and (5) damages proximately caused by the defendant’s acts. 
Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993). 
Other states do not recognize a separate spoliation tort but permit spoliation to be 
actionable as a type of negligence. See, e.g., Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 477 
F.3d 502, 509–10 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court of Illinois has emphasized, however, 
that the state does not recognize a tort of intentional spoliation of evidence, and that 
negligent spoliation is not itself an independent tort but rather a type of negligence.” (citing 
Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 269–70 (Ill. 1995))). 
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initiation of an action.11  Specifically, most courts describe the preservation 
obligation as a duty to preserve information because one knows or should 
know that it is relevant to future litigation.12
1.  Triggering the Preservation Obligation 
  Two key parameters of the 
duty to preserve exist:  the trigger for the duty and its scope.  The trigger 
refers to the point in time at which an individual or entity can be said to be 
under the duty to preserve.  Scope refers to the identification of materials 
and information that must be preserved pursuant to the duty and to whom 
the duty attaches.  Each of these two concepts are discussed in turn. 
As just mentioned, courts tend to describe the trigger for the duty to 
preserve—prior to the initiation of litigation13—as the point at which a 
party “reasonably anticipates litigation”14 or “should have known that the 
evidence may be relevant to future litigation.”15
 
 11. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The right to 
impose sanctions for spoliation arises from a court’s inherent power to control the judicial 
process and litigation, but the power is limited to that necessary to redress conduct ‘which 
abuses the judicial process.’” (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 
(1991))); see also Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Allegations of spoliation, including the destruction of evidence in 
pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation, are addressed in federal courts through the 
inherent power to regulate the litigation process if the conduct occurs before a case is 
filed . . . .”). 
  The question is—when 
 12. See, e.g., John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008) (indicating that the 
duty to preserve evidence is triggered when a “party has notice that the evidence is relevant 
to litigation or . . . should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 
1013, 1032 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A spoliation sanction is proper where (1) a party has a duty to 
preserve evidence because it knew, or should have known, that litigation was imminent, and 
(2) the adverse party was prejudiced by the destruction of the evidence.”); Silvestri, 271 F.3d 
at 591 (“The duty to preserve material evidence arises not only during litigation but also 
extends to that period before the litigation when a party reasonably should know that the 
evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation.”). 
 13. Once litigation has been instituted, notice of the litigation certainly places a party 
under a duty to preserve. See, e.g., Cache La Poudre Feeds, L.L.C. v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 
244 F.R.D. 614, 622 (D. Colo. 2007) (“Cache La Poudre initiated legal action against Land 
O’Lakes on February 24, 2004 with the filing of its initial Complaint.  As of that date, 
Defendants clearly had an obligation to preserve relevant evidence.”).  However—as is being 
discussed in the main text—such a duty often can arise prior to the institution of an action. 
See, e.g., Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (“This obligation to 
preserve evidence arises when the party has notice that the evidence is relevant to 
litigation—most commonly when suit has already been filed, providing the party responsible 
for the destruction with express notice, but also on occasion in other circumstances, as for 
example when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future 
litigation.”).  This Article focuses exclusively on the duty to preserve that arises prior to the 
filing of a complaint. 
 14. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 
685 F. Supp. 2d. 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 15. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001); see also 
O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 587 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he issue here 
concerns when the defendant was or should have been on notice that litigation requiring the 
missing reports as evidence might ensue.”); Goetz, 531 F.3d at 459 (“[I]t is beyond question 
that a party to civil litigation has a duty to preserve relevant information, including 
[electronically stored information (ESI)], when that party ‘has notice that the evidence is 
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can a party be said to have met either of those criteria?  A generalized 
concern about litigation16 or the mere existence of a dispute17 does not 
suffice to trigger the duty.  Rather, the prospect of litigation must at least be 
an anticipated or foreseeable possibility,18 with some courts having required 
future litigation to be probable to provide the requisite notice that triggers 
the duty to preserve.19  Although whether a party should have anticipated 
litigation is a subjective consideration and inevitably a fact-specific 
inquiry,20
a.  Letters from Prospective Adversaries 
 it is possible to set forth some conditions under which courts are 
likely to find that the potential for future litigation is sufficiently 
foreseeable so as to trigger the duty to preserve. 
If a party receives a pre-litigation hold request21 or some variation of a 
pre-litigation demand letter22—such as a notice-of-breach letter,23
 
relevant to litigation or . . . should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future 
litigation.’” (quoting Fujitsu, 247 F.3d at 436)). 
 a cease-
 16. See Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 264 F.R.D. 517, 526 (N.D. Cal. 
2009) (“A general concern over litigation does not trigger a duty to preserve evidence.  Real 
had no duty to preserve relevant documents or evidence until a potential claim was identified 
or future litigation was probable.” (citations omitted)); cf. AAB Joint Venture v. United 
States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 445 (2007) (noting, in the work-product protection context, that “in 
anticipation of litigation” under “Rule 26(b)(3) requires a more immediate showing than the 
remote possibility of litigation. Litigation must at least be a real possibility at the time of 
preparation or, in other words, the document must be prepared with an eye to some specific 
litigation” (quoting Energy Capital Corp. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 481, 485 (2000))). 
 17. See, e.g., Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 510 (D. Md. 2009) 
(“The mere existence of a dispute does not necessarily mean that parties should reasonably 
anticipate litigation or that the duty to preserve arises.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Jain v. Memphis Shelby Cnty. Airport Auth., No. 08-2119-STA-dkv, 2010 
WL 711328, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 25, 2010) (“The first counsel retained by Plaintiff then 
sent a demand letter on September 21, 2007, that is, about ten days after the accident putting 
Defendant MSCAA on further notice of the possibility of legal action.”); Samsung Elecs. 
Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 524, 568 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“[T]he point at which 
litigation becomes probable does not necessarily correspond with when a party anticipated, 
or reasonably should have anticipated, litigation.”), vacated on other grounds, 523 F.3d 1374 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 19. See Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 80, 82 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (“A 
duty to preserve is an affirmative obligation, which arises when the party in possession of the 
evidence knows that litigation by the party seeking the evidence is pending or probable . . . .” 
(quoting Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F. Supp. 2d 503, 518 (D.N.J. 2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 574 F.3d 169 (3rd Cir. 2009); see 
also In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“The 
future litigation must be ‘probable,’ which has been held to mean ‘more than a possibility.’” 
(quoting Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 
2006))); Henkel Corp. v. Polyglass USA, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 454, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(finding the duty to preserve arises when litigation is “‘likely to be commenced’” (quoting 
Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991))). 
 20. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (“[D]etermin[ing] when a duty to preserve arises in a particular case and the 
extent of that duty requires careful analysis of the specific facts and circumstances.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
27, 2003) (speaking of a post-complaint but pre-service hold letter sent to the defendant and 
holding that such letter triggered the defendant’s duty “to preserve evidence that it had notice 
would likely be the subject of discovery requests”). 
2011] THE PRESERVATION OBLIGATION 2009 
and-desist letter,24 or a cure notice25—courts have found that the receiving 
party was on notice of the litigation, and thus, had a duty to preserve 
relevant material.  It appears, however, that such communications must give 
sufficient certainty of impending litigation and fairly apprise recipients of 
its likely scope.26  Thus, in AAB Joint Venture v. United States,27 for 
example, a letter from a contractor to the U.S. government explaining that 
site conditions varied from those represented in the government’s 
geotechnical report and reserving the right to seek an equitable adjustment 
for the costs associated with “present and future unanticipated subsurface 
conditions” was deemed insufficient to trigger the government’s duty to 
preserve, while the actual filing of the requests for equitable adjustment was 
treated as sufficient.28
 
 22. See, e.g., Cache La Poudre Feeds, L.L.C. v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 
623 (D. Colo. 2007) (“[A] demand letter alone may be sufficient to trigger an obligation to 
preserve evidence and support a subsequent motion for spoliation sanctions.”). 
  Although demand letters need to be explicit about 
the possibility of litigation to trigger the duty to preserve, courts have not 
 23. See Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 264 F.R.D. 517, 520, 526–27 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (when defendants “formally advised Real that it was in violation of the 
[license agreement,] . . . Real was on notice that litigation was probable and a potential claim 
was identifiable”). 
 24. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 409, 430 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Where copyright infringement is alleged, and a cease and desist letter 
issues, such a letter triggers the duty to preserve evidence, even prior to the filing of 
litigation.” (citing Fox v. Riverdeep, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 13622, 2008 WL 5244297, at *7 (E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 16, 2008); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, No. 03 Civ. 
5340(JF)(RS), 2007 WL 1848665, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2007))). 
 25. See Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 57, 62 (2003) (finding, in a 
dispute between a contractor and the government over differing site conditions, that the 
government “reasonably should have known of a potential litigation claim . . . when it issued 
a cure notice” to the plaintiff regarding its performance at the site at issue). 
 26. See Asher Assocs., L.L.C. v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., No. 07-cv-
01379-WYD-CBS, 2009 WL 1328483, at *8 (D. Colo. May 12, 2009) (“While the 
[September 1] letter had not specifically threatened litigation, the September 8 
correspondence adopted a decidedly different and emphatic tone. . . . The September 8[] 
letter demanded an ‘immediate payment’ and imposed a five-day deadline for making that 
payment.”); Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 511 (D. Md. 2009) (“It 
may be that a letter that merely identifies a dispute but expresses an invitation to discuss it or 
otherwise negotiate does not trigger the duty to preserve evidence, but where, as here, the 
letter openly threatens litigation, then the recipient is on notice that litigation is reasonably 
foreseeable and the duty to preserve evidence relevant to that dispute is triggered.”); Cache 
La Poudre Feeds, 244 F.R.D. at 623 (“[A] letter must be more explicit and less equivocal 
[than] Cache La Poudre’s 2002 and 2003 correspondence with Land O’Lakes. . . . Although 
[the letter] noted the potential for customer confusion and alluded to Land O’Lakes’ possible 
‘exposure,’ [the] letter did not threaten litigation and did not demand that Land O’Lakes 
preserve potentially relevant materials. Rather, Cache La Poudre hinted at the possibility of a 
non-litigious resolution.”). 
 27. 75 Fed. Cl. 432 (2007). 
 28. Id. at 441–42 (“The letter did not provide Defendant with the requisite certainty or 
specificity of impending litigation, nor did it apprise Defendant of the scope of the claims 
which would be filed.  The Court agrees with Defendant that the duty to preserve evidence 
did not attach until July 2002, when the REAs were filed and when Defendant could 
reasonably have anticipated the instant litigation.”). But see Renda Marine, Inc. v. United 
States, 58 Fed. Cl. 57, 62 (2003) (“Plaintiff’s purported oral communication in October 1999 
with defendant concerning the alleged differing site condition, if proven to have occurred, 
could be construed as notice to defendant that a potential litigation claim existed.”). 
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found it necessary that such letters specify and describe an attendant 
preservation obligation, even though including such a preservation request 
might be wise practice for counsel.29
b.  Notice of an Incident 
 
When an accident occurs that results in or has the potential to result in 
serious harm, mere notice of the accident itself can make litigation 
reasonably foreseeable.30  For example, in an action by an airport slip-and-
fall victim against the airport authority and the maintenance company, the 
court held that because airport police immediately completed an incident 
report that alerted them to the seriousness of the plaintiff’s injury, “almost 
from the moment the accident occurred, [the airport authority] had a duty to 
preserve the video.”31  On the other hand, accidents that result in minor or 
initially imperceptible harm may be viewed as not having put a party on 
notice of potential litigation.32  Other types of incidents, such as workplace 
harassment, may in and of themselves yield less certainty regarding the 
likelihood of litigation, although if a substantial number of key personnel 
are aware of the matter and of an employee’s related dissatisfaction with the 
employer’s response, such awareness should put the employer on notice of 
the possibility of litigation against it as a result.33
 
 29. See Cache La Poudre Feeds, 244 F.R.D. at 623 (acknowledging that “the common-
law obligation to preserve relevant material is not necessarily dependent upon the tender of a 
‘preservation letter’” but advising that “prudent counsel would be wise to ensure that a 
demand letter sent to a putative party also addresses any contemporaneous preservation 
obligations” (citing Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100 (D. 
Md. 2003))); Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 100 (“While a litigant certainly may request that an 
adversary agree to preserve electronic records during the pendency of a case, or even seek a 
court order directing that this happen, it is not required, and a failure to do so does not vitiate 
the independent obligation of an adverse party to preserve such information.”).  There are 
risks to sending a preservation request letter; if the letter does not include reference to certain 
items, the adversary may subsequently be able to defend itself against a spoliation accusation 
based on its failure to preserve the unrequested material or information. See, e.g., Swofford 
v. Eslinger, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Neither preservation letter and 
no other notice to Defendants suggested that the uniforms should be preserved. . . . [T]he 
Court cannot find that Defendants were on notice that the uniforms worn by the Officers on 
the night of April 20, 2006, needed to be preserved . . . .”). 
 
 30. See, e.g., Houlihan v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 7439(RCC), 2003 WL 
22271206, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) (“Where a hotel guest is injured in a hotel room, 
there is a strong likelihood that such injury will be the subject of future litigation.”). 
 31. Jain v. Memphis Shelby Cnty. Airport Auth., No. 08-2119-STA-dkv, 2010 WL 
711328, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 25, 2010). 
 32. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2003) 
(“[T]his particular investigation revealed that Johnson had not been seriously injured and 
never indicated that he might seek legal relief.  We agree that nothing about the investigation 
or the circumstances surrounding the accident would have put Wal-Mart on notice that there 
was a substantial chance that the Johnsons would pursue a claim.”). 
 33. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Merely 
because one or two employees contemplate the possibility that a fellow employee might sue 
does not generally impose a firm-wide duty to preserve. But in this case, it appears that 
almost everyone associated with Zubulake recognized the possibility that she might sue.”). 
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c.  Duties of Prospective Plaintiffs 
Prospective plaintiffs inevitably must anticipate the litigation they 
institute at some point prior to the filing of a complaint.34  Retaining or 
consulting with counsel35 or experts36 are indicia of anticipating litigation 
as a plaintiff, as is documenting and estimating the cause37 or extent of the 
loss incurred as the result of an incident or malfunction of some kind.38  
Indeed, the plaintiff’s experience or discovery itself of the harmful incident, 
malfunction, or other problem may trigger the duty to preserve material 
relevant to future litigation surrounding the incident.39  When the losses 
associated with an incident are substantial from the victim’s perspective, 
plaintiffs can be expected to have anticipated litigation as well.40  In sum, 
all of these factors should make it apparent to the plaintiff that litigation is 
sufficiently probable that all relevant information should be preserved.41
 
 34. See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d. 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“A plaintiff’s duty is more often triggered 
before litigation commences, in large part because plaintiffs control the timing of 
litigation.”). 
 
 35. See, e.g., Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 334, 340 (D. 
Conn. 2009) (holding that prospective plaintiff anticipates litigation when counsel is retained 
in the matter).  Labeling material as work-product protected may also serve as evidence that 
a prospective plaintiff (or defendant) anticipates litigation. See, e.g., Crown Castle USA, Inc. 
v. Fred A. Nudd Corp., No. 05-CV-6163T, 2010 WL 1286366, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 
2010) (“I find that the duty actually arose as early as August 2004—when several Crown 
employees, including in-house counsel, considered filing a notice of claim with Nudd’s 
insurance carrier and instituted a practice of labeling Nudd-related communications as 
privileged under the work product doctrine . . . .”). 
 36. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The reason 
why [counsel] was retained and why he promptly retained reconstruction experts was to 
collect evidence before it was lost.  The relevance of the evidence and the type of lawsuit to 
file became clear when Silvestri’s experts conducted their inspection and concluded that the 
‘failure by the airbag to deploy in this accident must be considered a defect that 
unnecessarily added to Mr. Silvestri’s injuries.’”). 
 37. See id. (finding that the plaintiff could have anticipated litigation once plaintiff’s 
experts concluded that a product defect caused additional injury to the plaintiff). 
 38. See Chrysler Realty Co. v. Design Forum Architects, Inc.. No. 06-CV-11785, 2009 
WL 5217992, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 31, 2009) (finding that the plaintiff should have 
anticipated litigation against the designer of a malfunctioning HVAC system on the date 
when it hired a repairman to report on the problems with the system and repair them); Wade 
v. Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 174, 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he Court finds 
that Plaintiff had a duty to preserve all evidence regarding the RV [because, among other 
reasons,] . . . Plaintiff Motorists attempted to document the damage through photographs and 
reports [and] the person hired by Plaintiff Motorists to document the damage was an ‘expert’ 
fire investigator.”). 
 39. See Chrysler Realty, 2009 WL 5217992, at *5 n.1 (“Plaintiff probably should have 
reasonably anticipated litigation even before it hired [the repairman]—when the newly-
installed HVAC system stopped working properly.”). 
 40. See Wade, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (citing that “the magnitude of the losses was 
significant” as a factor supporting the finding that the plaintiff had a duty to preserve). 
 41. As Judge Denny Chin stated, 
I find that the following factors demonstrate that plaintiff was on notice that a 
lawsuit was likely so as to trigger a duty to preserve the evidence:  (1) the sheer 
magnitude of the losses; (2) that plaintiff attempted to document the damage 
through photographs and reports; and (3) that it immediately brought in counsel as 
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2.  Scope of the Pre-Litigation Preservation Obligation 
It is often said that the “duty to preserve potentially discoverable 
information does not require a party to keep every scrap of paper” in its 
file.42  Rather, courts generally describe the scope of the duty to preserve as 
extending to all unique, reasonably accessible information or tangible 
things that are relevant to prospective litigation.43  The information must be 
within the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) in its broadest sense, 
meaning it would be relevant not just to a claim or defense in future 
litigation, but to the subject matter of the prospective litigation.44  Subject 
matter relevance is the proper scope not only because at the pre-litigation 
stage one lacks information regarding specific claims or defenses, but more 
importantly because such material may be subject to discovery on a court 
order if good cause is shown; such an order would be moot if there was not 
a duty to preserve material to that extent.45  Information beyond that scope 
would not be subject to the duty to preserve.46  Attorneys, not laypersons, 
should make the relevancy determination, since non-lawyers are likely to be 
unfamiliar with the broad meaning of legal relevance under Rule 26(b) as 
including information likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
in a case.47  There is no duty to preserve multiple copies of the same 
material or information.48
 
well as experts to assess the damage and attempt to ascertain its likely causes in 
anticipation of litigation. 
 
Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Liebert Corp., No. 96 CIV. 6675(DC), 1998 WL 363834, at *4 
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1998). 
 42. In re Old Banc One S’holders Sec. Litig., No. 00 C 2100, 2005 WL 3372783, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2005); see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Must a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of litigation, preserve 
every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic document, and every backup tape?  The 
answer is clearly, ‘no.’”). 
 43. See, e.g., Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217 (“[A]nyone who anticipates being a party or is 
a party to a lawsuit must not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an 
adversary.”). 
 44. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); see, e.g., Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 
335, 339 (M.D. La. 2006) (“The duty also extends to documents prepared for those 
individuals and to information that is relevant to the claims and defenses of any party, or 
which is ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.’” (quoting Zubulake, 220 
F.R.D. at 218)); Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005) 
(“Any information relevant to the claims or defenses of any party, or which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the litigation, is covered by the duty to preserve.”). 
 45. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin was so kind as to emphasize this latter point to me in a 
conversation about this piece. 
 46. See, e.g., Paul v. USIS Commercial Servs., Inc., No. 04-cv-01384-REB-CBS, 2007 
WL 2727222, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 2007) (“A demand that information not subject to 
discovery be preserved does not trigger a duty to preserve that information.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Clark Constr. Grp., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 229 F.R.D. 131, 136–37 
(W.D. Tenn. 2005) (“[T]he decision as to what was potentially relevant should not have been 
left to Webber’s sole discretion. Webber is not a lawyer . . . . [W]hat might be potentially 
relevant to a person trained in law might not be relevant to a lay person.”). 
 48. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 218 (“A party or anticipated party must retain all relevant 
documents (but not multiple identical copies) in existence at the time the duty to preserve 
attaches, and any relevant documents created thereafter.”). 
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The scope of a prospective party’s preservation obligation bears some 
relationship to the time and expense associated with preserving all relevant 
information that would otherwise be subject to the duty to preserve.  
Extraordinary or cost-prohibitive efforts should not be expected in any but 
the most high-stakes litigation.49  Thus, there is ordinarily no duty to 
preserve “inaccessible” information such as that contained on backup tapes 
used for disaster recovery purposes,50 because, as Rule 26(b)(2)(B) 
recognizes, preserving such material may be unduly burdensome.51  
However, if the expense associated with electronically stored information 
derives more from the cost of its translation and production rather than its 
preservation, there would be less justification for excluding such material 
from the scope of the preservation obligation.  Additionally, inaccessible 
information on backup tapes used for emergency recovery may fall within 
the duty to preserve if it is identified as containing the documents of “key 
players” in the prospective litigation and if such information is not available 
from a more accessible source.52  Transitory information that is not 
typically retained does not fall within the duty to preserve until a party is 
given more certainty regarding whether the adverse party will consider the 
information relevant.53
Prospective parties must exercise their preservation obligations with 
respect to all information and material under their control; however, if the 
material is not in their control, they must at least inform potential 





 49. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (“Whether preservation or discovery conduct is acceptable in a case depends on 
what is reasonable, and that in turn depends on whether what was done—or not done—was 
proportional to that case . . . .”). 
  When relevant information is in the hands of third parties, 
 50. See Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 218 (“As a general rule, that litigation hold does not 
apply to inaccessible backup tapes (e.g., those typically maintained solely for the purpose of 
disaster recovery), which may continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the 
company’s policy.  On the other hand, if backup tapes are accessible (i.e., actively used for 
information retrieval), then such tapes would likely be subject to the litigation hold.”). 
 51. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“A party need not provide discovery of electronically 
stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because 
of undue burden or cost.”). 
 52. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 218. 
 53. As held in Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009): 
  Some of the other evidence at issue in the instant motion, such as Usage Logs 
and Music Files contained on Defendants’ servers, is transitory in nature, is not 
routinely created or maintained by Defendants for their business purposes, and 
requires additional steps to retrieve and store.  Arguably, Defendants may not have 
had an obligation to preserve such evidence until placed on notice that Plaintiffs 
considered it relevant and were requesting it. 
Id. at 431. 
 54. In Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2001), the court stated: 
If a party cannot fulfill this duty to preserve because he does not own or control the 
evidence, he still has an obligation to give the opposing party notice of access to 
the evidence or of the possible destruction of the evidence if the party anticipates 
litigation involving that evidence. 
Id. at 591. 
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a prospective party would have a duty to preserve that information only if 
the party has control of the information, meaning it has “the right, authority, 
or practical ability to obtain the documents from a non-party to the 
action.”55
B.  Sanctioning Breaches of the Duty To Preserve 
 
If information subject to the duty to preserve is altered, lost, or destroyed, 
the issue of sanctions comes into the picture.  When determining the 
appropriate sanction or remedy for spoliation, there are two relevant 
parameters:  culpability and prejudice.56  That is, the appropriate response 
to spoliation depends on the degree of the spoliator’s culpability and the 
extent of the prejudice caused to the adverse party.57
1.  Culpability 
  Each of these two 
concepts will be reviewed below, followed by a discussion of the range of 
available sanctions that courts have imposed for breaches of the pre-
litigation duty to preserve. 
Culpability refers to the degree of fault that may be attributed to a 
spoliator’s breach of the duty to preserve.  Some fault on the part of the 
spoliator is necessary before sanctions of any kind become appropriate, 
although severe prejudice caused by inadvertent or faultless loss of relevant 
information might still be remedied in other ways.58  The range of 
culpability that may attend any loss of relevant evidence may fall anywhere 
“along a continuum of fault—ranging from innocence through the degrees 
of negligence to intentionality.”59
Negligence.  Negligence describes information losses that result from 
poorly designed litigation hold instructions or insufficient or inept 
preservation efforts.  Thus, there is some effort to preserve relevant 
information, but the effort is ultimately inadequate in ways that more 
 
 
 55. Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 515 (D. Md. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
 56. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., 
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, SECOND EDITION:  BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & 
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, Principle 14, at 70 
(2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_
PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf (“Sanctions, including spoliation findings, should be considered 
by the court only if it finds that there was a clear duty to preserve, a culpable failure to 
preserve and produce relevant electronically stored information, and a reasonable probability 
that the loss of the evidence has materially prejudiced the adverse party.”). 
 57. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (“Determining whether sanctions are warranted and, if so, what they should 
include, requires a court to consider both the spoliating party’s culpability and the level of 
prejudice to the party seeking discovery.”). 
 58. See id. (“[E]ven if there is an inadvertent loss of evidence but severe prejudice to the 
opposing party, that too will influence the appropriate response, recognizing that sanctions 
(as opposed to other remedial steps) require some degree of culpability.”). 
 59. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988)). 
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diligence and competence would have avoided.  For example, a 
preservation effort may omit custodians who were likely to have 
discoverable information or may neglect to refer to the full range of search 
terms or topics that would identify material that should fall within the scope 
of the duty to preserve.60
Gross Negligence or Recklessness.  Gross negligence mainly 
characterizes the failure to undertake any preservation efforts with respect 
to the material in question once the duty to preserve arises.
  Because greater care and thoroughness would 
have averted the spoliation, fault is attributable to the spoliating party, but 
only at the level of negligence. 
61  The failure to 
issue a litigation hold at all,62 or the complete lack of a document retention 
policy,63 are more substantial deviations from the standard of conduct 
expected of prospective parties in the face of litigation than mere 
negligence.64  Because the ultimate loss of evidence is the consequence of 
unpardonable neglect rather than merely insufficient preservation efforts, 
the level of fault under such circumstances is described as recklessness or 
gross negligence.65
 
 60. See, e.g., Treppel v. Biovail, 249 F.R.D. 111, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing the 
defendant’s efforts to preserve the ESI of key executives as negligent because the defendant 
did not go beyond simply instructing those executives to preserve the information). 
 
 61. See, e.g., Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 380 (D. Conn. 2007) 
(finding gross negligence where there was “no evidence that the defendants did anything to 
stop the routine destruction of the backup tapes after [their] obligation to preserve arose”). 
 62. See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d. 456, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he failure to issue a written litigation 
hold constitutes gross negligence because that failure is likely to result in the destruction of 
relevant information.”). 
 63. For example, see Keithley v. Home Store.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 
WL 3833384 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008): 
The facts—specifically that Defendants have no written document retention policy 
nor was there a specific litigation hold put in place, that at least some evidence was 
destroyed when the Development Computer failed, that Defendants made material 
misrepresentations to the Court and Plaintiffs regarding the existence of reports, 
and that Defendants have produced an avalanche of responsive documents and 
electronically stored information only after the Court informed the parties that 
sanctions were appropriate—show a level of reckless disregard for their discovery 
obligation and for candor and accuracy before the Court sufficient to warrant 
severe monetary and evidentiary sanctions. 
Id. at *16. 
 64. Not all courts treat the lack of a document retention policy or litigation hold as 
automatically indicative of sanctionable wrongdoing. See, e.g., Haynes v. Dart, No. 08 C 
4834, 2010 WL 140387, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2010) (“The failure to institute a document 
retention policy, in the form of a litigation hold, is relevant to the court’s consideration, but it 
is not per se evidence of sanctionable conduct.” (citing Danis v. USN Commc’ns, Inc., No. 
98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *39 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000))).  Others treat the lack of a 
retention policy as merely negligent. See, e.g., In re Old Banc One S’holders Sec. Litig., No. 
00 C 2100, 2005 WL 3372783, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2005) (“While the loss of several 
categories of documents reflects poor judgment, and the failure to create and disseminate a 
comprehensive document retention policy constitutes negligence on the part of Bank One[,] 
there is no evidence that Bank One willfully destroyed any documents.”). 
 65. In In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598 (D.N.J. 
1997), the court stated:  
Over 9,000 files were cleansed.  Prudential is unable to specify what documents 
were taken from files, nor is it able to identify the files from which the documents 
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Willfulness and Bad Faith.  Bad faith involves the intentional destruction 
of information with the purpose of thwarting the adversary’s ability to make 
its case, while willful destruction—a separate category recognized in some 
jurisdictions—is merely deliberate without such intent.66  A finding of bad 
faith implies dishonesty, with the spoliator’s motive being its own self-
interest in avoiding a finding of liability.67
2.  Prejudice 
  Behavior of this kind is the 
most egregious, representing an overt affront to the judicial process, and 
thus, can inspire the most severe sanctions. 
Sanctions are warranted for spoliation only if the innocent party has been 
prejudiced by the loss of information, something that is possible only if “the 
destroyed evidence was ‘relevant’ to the party’s claim or defense such that a 
reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or 
defense.”68
 
were taken. Because the prejudice to affected party opponents is so substantial, 
Prudential’s consistent pattern of failing to curb document destruction, which at 
the very least was grossly negligent conduct, merits sanctions, despite the Court’s 
finding that Prudential’s conduct was not willful. 
  In other words, although information that is responsive to a 
document request is within the scope of material that must be preserved 
Id. at 616 (demonstrating the seriousness with which courts regard spoliation that is the 
product of gross negligence, albeit in the context of the violation of a court order to 
preserve).  The court in Prudential imposed a $1 million fine as sanctions for the loss of 
information. Id. at 617; see also United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 
21, 26 (D.D.C. 2004) (declining to impose an adverse inference instruction but imposing a 
nearly $3 million fine and precluding the testimony of multiple defense witness for “the 
reckless disregard and gross indifference displayed by Philip Morris and Altria Group 
toward their discovery and document preservation obligations”). 
 66. Bad faith should be distinguished from “willful” destruction, which is defined as 
destruction that is “deliberate or intentional,” but not necessarily done with the intent to 
harm the case of the adversary. See, e.g., Powell v. Town of Sharpsburg, 591 F. Supp. 2d 
814, 820–21 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (noting Fourth Circuit case law indicating that “destruction 
can be willful when done through an organization’s document retention policy” and finding 
the defendant’s destruction of documents pursuant to such a policy willful, but not in bad 
faith (referencing Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 322–23 (4th Cir. 2008))).  As noted, 
not all jurisdictions recognize willfulness as an intermediate and distinct category lying 
somewhere between negligence and bad faith. See, e.g., Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., 
L.L.C., No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL 1308629, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006) (“Once a party is 
on notice that files or documents in their possession are relevant to pending litigation, the 
failure to prevent the destruction of relevant documents crosses the line between negligence 
and bad faith, even where the documents are destroyed according to a routine document 
retention policy.” (citing Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865, 
at *7 (N. D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2003))). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Heiser, No. 4:04-CR-270, 2006 WL 1149254, at *11 
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2006) (holding that “‘bad faith’ with respect to destruction of evidence 
requires more than mere negligence, it requires ill-will towards [the defendant] or a 
conscious effort to frustrate his defense”); Attorneys Title Guar. Fund v. Goodman, 179 F. 
Supp. 2d 1268, 1277 (D. Utah 2001) (“‘Bad faith’ is the antithesis of good faith and has been 
defined in the cases to be when a thing is done dishonestly and not merely negligently.  It is 
also defined as that which imports a dishonest purpose and implies wrongdoing or some 
motive of self-interest.” (quoting Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, 440 P.2d 
869, 870 (Utah 1968))). 
 68. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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during pending litigation, the imposition of sanctions for spoliation requires 
a showing that the missing information actually would have been helpful to 
the innocent party in establishing one of its claims or defenses.69  Once 
relevance in this sense is shown, prejudice is established, although the 
extent of the prejudice depends on the degree of impairment to the innocent 
party’s ability to litigate its case; “[p]rejudice can range along a continuum 
from an inability to prove claims or defenses to little or no impact on the 
presentation of proof.”70  The degree of prejudice is lessened, if not 
eliminated, when there is other evidence available to support the adverse 
party’s claim or defense.71  Absent any impairment, courts may decline to 
impose sanctions.72
Parties seeking spoliation sanctions carry the burden of proof on this 
point, meaning they have to demonstrate that the lost information would 
have supported one of their claims or defenses and that the loss was 
prejudicial.  Some courts presume relevance and prejudice when bad faith 
or gross negligence is shown, while others seem to keep the burden on the 
movant regardless of the degree of the spoliator’s culpability.
 
73
3.  Appropriate Sanctions 
 
The level of the spoliator’s culpability and the degree of prejudice to the 
innocent party both guide a court in its determination of the appropriate 
sanction or remedy for a breach of the duty to preserve.  As with other 
instances of a court’s sanctioning authority, the appropriate sanction for 
 
 69. See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec. 
L.L.C., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Sampson v. City of Cambridge, 251 
F.R.D. 172, 183 (D. Md. 2008) (“Because plaintiff has not established that access to 
Pritchett’s emails would have produced evidence which a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude supported her claims, plaintiff’s Motion to Sanction Defendant for Spoliation of 
Evidence . . . is denied.”). 
 70. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex. 
2010). 
 71. See, e.g., Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (“While many of these documents 
may be relevant, the Citco Defendants suffered no prejudice because all were eventually 
obtained from other sources.”); Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-394-Oc-
10GRJ, 2008 WL 4642596, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2008) (“[T]he memo is not critical to 
Plaintiff’s ability to prove her case because there is other evidence potentially available to 
Plaintiff to prove her claim.”). 
 72. See Jackson v. AFSCME Local 196, No. 3:07CV0471 (JCH), 2010 WL 864509, at 
*4 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2010) (denying the plaintiff’s motion for an adverse inference 
sanction because “[p]laintiff has not demonstrated, on this record, that their ability to litigate 
this case has been substantially impaired”). 
 73. See, e.g., Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 109 (“[W]here a party seeking an adverse 
inference adduces evidence that its opponent destroyed potential evidence (or otherwise 
rendered it unavailable) in bad faith or through gross negligence . . . , that same evidence of 
the opponent’s state of mind will frequently also be sufficient to permit a jury to conclude 
that the missing evidence is favorable to the party . . . .”);  Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 
220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[W]hen the destruction is negligent, relevance must 
be proven by the party seeking the sanctions.”). 
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spoliation is left to the broad discretion of the courts74 based on their 
judgment—on a case-by-case basis75—of what sanctions would best serve 
the deterrence, punitive, and remedial interests that sanctions are supposed 
to serve.76  The range of possible remedies or sanctions was helpfully laid 
out by Judge Scheindlin in Pension Committee:  “The choices include—
from least harsh to most harsh—further discovery, cost-shifting, fines, 
special jury instructions, preclusion, and the entry of default judgment or 
dismissal (terminating sanctions).”77  Special jury instructions range from 
informing the jury that certain facts are deemed to be true, to mandating or 
simply permitting the jury to presume that the lost evidence is both relevant 
and favorable to the innocent party.78
Because sanctions are a discretionary matter, most courts do not adhere 
to any rigid rules regarding what sanctions require which levels of 
culpability.  However, there is a split of authority on what degree of 
culpability is required for the most severe sanctions.  In some circuits, all 
sanctions are available so long as there is culpability of some kind,
 
79 while 
other circuits require a showing of bad faith before harsh sanctions such as 
dismissal and spoliation instructions may be imposed.80
 
 74. See Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Grp., Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 267 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Whether 
exercising its inherent power, or acting pursuant to Rule 37, a district court has wide 
discretion in sanctioning a party for discovery abuses and for the spoliation of evidence.”). 
  Dismissal is 
 75. See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The 
determination of an appropriate sanction for spoliation, if any, is confined to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge and is assessed on a case-by-case basis.” (citing West v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1019–20 (2d Cir. 1980))). 
 76. The court in West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. expressed that 
[t]he sanction should be designed to:  (1) deter parties from engaging in spoliation; 
(2) place the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party who wrongfully created 
the risk; and (3) restore “the prejudiced party to the same position he would have 
been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing party.” 
West, 167 F.3d at 779 (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)); 
see also Reilly, 181 F.3d at 267 (“Trial judges should have the leeway to tailor sanctions to 
insure that spoliators do not benefit from their wrongdoing—a remedial purpose that is best 
adjusted according to the facts and evidentiary posture of each case.”). 
 77. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 78. See id. at 470. 
 79. See, e.g., Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Fred A. Nudd Corp., No. 05-CV-6163T, 2010 
WL 1286366, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010) (“A finding of bad faith or intentional 
misconduct is not a sine qua non to sanctioning a spoliator.  Rather, a finding of gross 
negligence will satisfy the culpable state of mind requirement, as will knowing or negligent 
destruction of evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Residential Funding 
Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002); Reilly, 181 F.3d at 268)); see 
also Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108 (“The sanction of an adverse inference may be 
appropriate in some cases involving the negligent destruction of evidence because each party 
should bear the risk of its own negligence.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (“In order 
to draw an inference that the [destroyed documents] contained information adverse to Sears, 
we must find that Sears intentionally destroyed the documents in bad faith.”); Henning v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1220 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts require evidence of 
intentional destruction or bad faith before a litigant is entitled to a spoliation instruction.”); 
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A spoliation-of-
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typically reserved for spoliation that is the product of bad faith, but it need 
not be so if the degree of prejudice is substantial.81  For some courts, to 
support the sanction of dismissal, the prejudice to the innocent party must 
be severe and there must be no lesser alternative sanction capable of 
achieving the goals of deterrence, placing the risk of an erroneous judgment 
on the spoliator, and remedying the prejudice suffered by the innocent 
party.82
II.  STANDARDIZING THE PRE-LITIGATION PRESERVATION OBLIGATION 
 
Because the policing of parties’ pre-litigation duty to preserve is rooted 
in the inherent authority of the federal courts, important aspects of the 
duty—including its trigger and scope—and components of the sanctioning 
authority—including the degree of culpability required, the burden of 
demonstrating relevance and prejudice, and the appropriate remedy or 
sanction under the circumstances—can vary across jurisdictions.  Although 
the variation is not extreme, it leaves prospective litigants less certain about 
their obligations once litigation is anticipated, and results in wasteful and 
time-consuming satellite litigation over whether the duty to preserve was 
breached and if so, what sanction or remedy is appropriate.83
A.  Inspiration from Current Federal Rules 
  
Standardization of the rules regarding pre-litigation preservation obligations 
and related sanctions would be a welcome development that would give 
prospective litigants a much clearer sense of their preservation 
obligations—at least in relation to the federal courts. 
Could an addition to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure possibly 
address pre-litigation preservation obligations and sanctions for the breach 
thereof?  Although the Rules largely govern matters taking place in the 
context of a pending action that has been commenced by the filing of a 
complaint, there are several instances in which pre-filing matters are 
 
evidence sanction requires a finding of intentional destruction indicating a desire to suppress 
the truth.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 
F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004); Richter v. City of Omaha, 729 N.W.2d 67, 71–73 (Neb. 
2007))); Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth 
Circuit permits an adverse inference against the destroyer of evidence only upon a showing 
of ‘bad faith’ or ‘bad conduct.’”); Penalty Kick Mgmt., Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 
1284, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n adverse inference is drawn from a party’s failure to 
preserve evidence only when the absence of that evidence is predicated on bad faith.” 
(quoting Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 1997))). 
 81. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
dismissal is “usually justified only in circumstances of bad faith” but “even when conduct is 
less culpable, dismissal may be necessary if the prejudice to the defendant is extraordinary, 
denying it the ability to adequately defend its case”). 
 82. See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779–80 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 83. See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 533 (D. Md. 
2010) (“The different approaches among the Circuits regarding the level of culpability that 
must be shown to warrant imposition of severe sanctions for spoliation is another reason why 
commentators have expressed such concern about the lack of a consensus standard and the 
uncertainty it causes.”). 
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addressed:  the duty to conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry under Rule 
11,84 the availability of a pre-filing order to perpetuate testimony under 
Rule 27,85 and the provision for an ex parte application for a temporary 
restraining order under Rule 65.86
1.  The Pre-Filing Inquiry of Rule 11 
  Indeed, each of these provisions offers 
some guidance on how a Federal Rule might regulate prospective litigants’ 
pre-litigation preservation obligations. 
Rule 11 demonstrates that sanctions can be imposed—under the Rules—
for duty breaches that occur prior to the filing of an action, specifically, the 
failure to conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry.87  Further, judicial 
experience in sanctioning under Rule 11 for breaches of the duty to conduct 
a reasonable pre-filing inquiry illustrates how sanctions might similarly be 
imposed for breaches of a pre-filing duty to preserve relevant information.  
When the Rule 11 pre-filing investigation is at issue, courts evaluate the 
precise nature and scope of the party’s investigation to assess its 
sufficiency.88
2.  Pre-Action Deposition Orders Under Rule 27 
  Courts engage in a similar investigation when a breach of the 
duty to preserve is at issue, determining whether and to what extent a party 
undertook to protect information subject to the duty to preserve.  Thus, it 
may be possible to regulate the pre-filing duty to preserve in the same 
manner as the pre-filing inquiry is regulated under Rule 11. 
Rule 27 is instructive for our present purposes because it specifically 
deals with the preservation of relevant information prior to the filing of an 
action, albeit in the form of testimony rather than documentary or tangible 
evidence.  Under Rule 27, persons who anticipate filing an action in federal 
court may petition the court for an order authorizing a deposition for the 
purpose of perpetuating testimony, provided the court is satisfied that doing 
so “may prevent a failure or delay of justice.”89
 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (requiring certification that a filing was made “after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances”). 
  The duty to preserve 
relevant information prior to litigation is similarly rooted in a concern with 
preventing a failure or delay of justice in the event that such information 
was lost or destroyed.  Might a rule be devised that would permit courts to 
be similarly petitioned to obtain pre-filing preservation orders in aid of a 
 85. Id. 27(a) (indicating that before filing an action “ [a] person who wants to perpetuate 
testimony about any matter cognizable in a United States court may file a verified petition in 
the district court for the district where any expected adverse party resides”). 
 86. Id. 65 (b)(1) (providing that a “court may issue a temporary restraining order without 
written or oral notice to the adverse party” under certain circumstances). 
 87. Id. 11; see L.F. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-08-2415, 2009 WL 3073926, at 
*23–24 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2009) (finding that the plaintiff “did not make a reasonable 
prefiling inquiry” and thus “[t]he record provides a basis to sanction [the plaintiff]”). 
 88. See, e.g., Eon-Net L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, No. C05-2129RSM, 2010 WL 2026756, 
at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 17, 2010) (excerpting colloquy between the court and the attorney 
regarding the nature and extent of the latter’s pre-filing inquiry). 
 89. FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(3). 
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prospective litigant’s interest in preserving material that might support 
claims or defenses to be raised in the expected action? 
3.  Temporary Restraining Orders Under Rule 65 
Finally, the ex parte temporary restraining order permitted under Rule 65 
is a classic device enabling a person in jeopardy of some immediate and 
irreparable harm to petition the court for an order compelling an adversary 
to forbear from engaging in the feared conduct.  The doctrine surrounding 
the duty to preserve and attendant sanctioning authority is similarly aimed 
at compelling adversaries to forbear from certain potentially harmful 
conduct—the destruction of relevant evidence.  Thus, the temporary 
restraining order example shows that courts have experience acting ex 
parte, before an adversary has received notice of litigation, to preserve the 
status quo in an effort to avert anticipated harm.  Similarly, a Federal Rule 
could address how courts might act—on an ex parte basis—to impose an 
express duty to preserve on prospective parties, the breach of which would 
subject them to sanctions in subsequent related litigation. 
4.  Towards a Rule Governing Pre-Action Preservation Obligations 
Drawing inspiration from these three sources in the Federal Rules, we 
can begin to imagine what a rule governing the pre-filing duty to preserve 
might look like.  The rule could permit prospective parties to seek 
preservation orders from the court prior to the commencement of an action 
and authorize sanctions for violations of such orders.  A key question would 
remain, however.  Should the rule recognize a duty to preserve that may 
arise prior to and independent of a court’s preservation order?  That is, 
should the rule attempt to codify the current law governing when a duty to 
preserve is triggered, or should it rely simply on court preservation orders 
as the trigger? 
If such a rule defined the duty to preserve as only arising upon the 
issuance and receipt of a court preservation order, there would remain a 
time period during which prospective litigants would be able to anticipate 
litigation but would not yet be subject to a preservation order.  Because 
courts would not wish to permit prospective litigants to destroy evidence 
with impunity during this gap period, courts would likely continue to use 
their inherent power to impose a duty to preserve during that time.  That 
being the case, any rule that seeks to regulate pre-litigation preservation 
obligations should attempt to address the obligations that arise even in the 
absence of a court preservation order, at least if the goal is to eliminate 
some of the variation and unpredictability that attends the current inherent 
power-based preservation doctrine.  In addition to making an attempt to 
define the preservation obligation, a revised rule could require certification 
that a document production is not tainted by a failure to fulfill the duty to 
preserve. 
Apart from the challenges associated with codifying the appropriate 
trigger for the pre-litigation duty to preserve, the other elements of the 
2022 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
duty—its scope and the circumstances warranting sanctions—are relatively 
simple matters to address by rule.  Rule 26 already defines the scope of 
information potentially subject to discovery, while Rule 34 limits a 
litigant’s responsibility for producing information to materials that are 
within its custody or control.  Rules 26(g) and 37 address a court’s ability to 
impose sanctions for discovery misconduct.90
B.  Proposed Amendments Addressing the Pre-Litigation Preservation 
Obligation 
  These provisions would be 
able to accommodate the addition of language imposing preservation 
obligations, perhaps with only a few tweaks being necessary to address 
sanctions for the breach thereof. 
With these thoughts in mind, what follows are proposed amendments to 
Rules 26 and 37 intended to address the preservation obligations of existing 
and prospective parties to a federal civil action.  The amendment to Rule 26 
imposes an additional certification on litigants who respond to discovery 
requests—that their responses are not missing any material or information 
due to a breach of the duty to preserve (the proposed new language is 
italicized): 
Rule 26. General Provisions Governing Discovery; Duty of Disclosure 
(g) Signing Disclosures and Discovery Requests, Responses, and 
Objections. 
(1) Signature Required; Effect of Signature. . . . By signing, an 
attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry: 
. . . 
(C) with respect to a production of documents, electronically 
stored information, and tangible things, it is not incomplete due 
to the failure to preserve material or information in violation of 
Rule 37(e). 
The proposed amendment to Rule 37(e), below, establishes the 
preservation obligation itself by authorizing courts to sanction discovery 
responses that are incomplete due to the failure to preserve information in 
anticipation of litigation.  It also affirms the existence of a duty to preserve 
once litigation commences and in the face of discovery requests, and 
provides for the ability of courts to issue preservation orders prior to the 
commencement of an action:91
 
 90. Thomas Y. Allman has previously suggested that preservation obligations could be 
addressed by an amendment to Rule 37, although his suggestions entail more modest 
amendments that incorporate references to “preservation obligations” without getting into 
details regarding the trigger for or nature of these obligations as does the amendment 
proposed herein. See THOMAS Y. ALLMAN, PRESERVATION AND SPOLIATION REVISITED:  IS IT 
TIME FOR ADDITIONAL RULEMAKING? 24 (2010). 
 
 91. The entirety of what appears here, except for what appears under subparagraph (5), 
reflects the proposed new language. 
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Rule 37(e).  Failure to Produce Documents, Electronically Stored 
Information, or Tangible Things. 
(1) In General.  A court where the action is pending may, on motion and 
after giving an opportunity to be heard, order sanctions if: 
(A) a party fails to produce requested documents, electronically stored 
information, or tangible things falling within the scope of discovery as 
defined by Rule 26(b), including material relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action if discovery of such material has been 
ordered; 
(B) the failure is due to that party’s negligent, reckless, knowing, or 
intentional alteration, destruction, mutilation, concealment, or 
falsification of such material or information; and 
(C) that party 
(i) had notice of the commencement of the action or discovery 
requests in the action; 
(ii) could reasonably anticipate the pending action before the 
action was filed at the time of such alteration, destruction, 
mutilation, concealment, or falsification occurred; or 
(iii) was subject to a statutory or regulatory duty to preserve the 
material or information. 
(2) Knowledge of Prospective Litigation.  A person may be deemed to 
have reasonably anticipated the pending action if, prior to its 
commencement, the party: 
(A) received a court order to preserve material or information relevant 
to the pending action; 
(B) received—no more than 60 days prior to the commencement of 
the pending action—an initial written notice from a party in the 
pending action raising the prospect of the action or requesting the 
preservation of the lost or altered material or information; 
(C) had notice of an act, omission, transaction, or occurrence 
underlying a claim in the pending action and notice of resulting harm 
of sufficient magnitude to make related litigation probable; or 
(D) took steps in anticipation of asserting or defending against a claim 
in the pending action. 
(3) Pre-Action Preservation Orders. 
(A) Petition.  A person who wants to preserve documents, 
information, or tangible objects relevant to a matter cognizable in a 
United States court may file a verified petition in the district court for 
the district where any expected adverse party resides or may be found.  
The petition must ask for an order requiring the named persons to 
preserve all documents, information, or tangible objects relevant to an 
action the petitioner expects to bring in a United States court.  The 
petition must be titled in the petitioner’s name and must show: 
(i) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable 
in a United States court but cannot presently bring it or cause it to 
be brought; 
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(ii) the subject matter of the expected action and the petitioner’s 
interest; 
(iii) the facts that the petitioner wants to establish by reference to 
the preserved material; and 
(iv) the names or a description of the persons whom the petitioner 
expects to be adverse parties and their addresses, so far as known. 
(B) Order.  If satisfied that preserving the material may prevent a 
failure or delay of justice, the court must issue an order requiring the 
prospective adverse parties to preserve all documents, information, or 
tangible objects relevant to the expected action described in the 
petition. 
(C) Motion To Dissolve or Modify the Order.  On 2 days’ notice to the 
party who obtained the order, the prospective adverse party may 
appear and move to dissolve or modify the order.  The court must 
then hear and decide the motion as promptly as justice requires. 
(D) Attorneys’ Fees, Costs & Expenses.  If the petitioner fails to bring 
the expected action in any court within 60 days of the issuance of the 
order, no court may sanction the prospective adverse party for not 
complying with the order and the court issuing the order may order 
the petitioner to pay costs, reasonable expenses, and attorneys’ fees 
incurred by the prospective adverse party associated with responding 
to the petition and complying with the preservation order. 
(4) Sanctions.  Unless the failing party demonstrates that the failure was 
substantially justified or harmless, the sanctions the court may impose 
include: 
(A) the payment of reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, 
caused by the failure; 
(B) informing the jury of the party’s failure; and 
(C) any other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed 
in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi). 
(5) Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information. Absent 
exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these 
rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information 
lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic 
information system.92
C.  Commentary 
 
Together, the proposed rules address all of the key components of the 
preservation obligation—its trigger and scope—and the factors relevant to 
determining sanctions for its breach—culpability, prejudice, and remedies.  
The proposed amendments attempt to embrace the views currently held by 
courts on these matters and to resolve disagreements among the courts.  
This section will comment on each aspect of the rule and offer insight into 
what motivated the choices made. 
 
 92. Hereinafter Proposed Rule 37(e). 
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1.  Trigger 
Regarding the trigger of the duty to preserve, the common law standard 
imposing a duty once litigation is reasonably foreseeable is adopted, in 
addition to the duty to preserve that attaches once litigation is commenced 
or that derives from separate statutory or regulatory requirements.  
However, rather than simply relying on the common law understanding of 
the concept of reasonably anticipating litigation, the pre-litigation standard 
for anticipating litigation is given further definition by reference to a 
discrete list of circumstances in which it would be appropriate to impute 
knowledge of prospective litigation to the spoliator:  a court order, an 
initial93 notice from a party, notice of an incident and resulting substantial 
harm, and actions by the spoliating party in anticipation of litigation.94
The choice to define the circumstances in which litigation is reasonably 
foreseeable was made in an attempt to constrain discretion under the rule
  The 
list is meant to be exclusive, limiting courts to finding reasonable 
anticipation of litigation only under the enumerated circumstances. 
95
 
 93. The proposed rule indicates that a notice from a prospective plaintiff only is 
effective to impose a preservation obligation for sixty days. See supra note 
 
with the aim of improving prospective litigants’ ability to predict when 
courts will deem them to have been under the duty to preserve.  These 
92 and 
accompanying text, at 37(e)(2)(B).  If the threatened litigation has not commenced within 
that time, the prospective adversary cannot be deemed to have been able to anticipate 
litigation in the matter on the basis of such notice, though other triggers may apply under the 
facts of any given case.  A successive notice threatening litigation by the prospective 
plaintiff would not revive the effect of such notice under the proposed rule because the rule 
refers to an “initial written notice.” See supra note 92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(2).  
This language is used to prevent prospective plaintiffs from using successive notices of 
potential litigation at the end of expiring sixty-day periods to keep prospective adversaries 
under an ongoing preservation obligation for litigation that has been promised but not 
delivered. 
 94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(2). 
 95. Notwithstanding these limitations, courts will always be free, to some extent, to go 
beyond these constraints if they impose sanctions not under the rule but under their inherent 
authority. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991) (holding that 
federal courts have the inherent power to “fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which 
abuses the judicial process”).  However, a district court’s ability to do so may be quite 
limited if the exclusivity of the proposed rule is interpreted as precluding any other bases for 
finding that the preservation obligation has been triggered, as the inherent power may not be 
exercised in a manner that is inconsistent with the Federal Rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83, at 
1985 advisory committee notes (“In all cases not provided for by rule, the district judges and 
magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or 
those of the district in which they act.”).  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit explained, 
  Obviously, the district court, in devising means to control cases before it, may 
not exercise its inherent authority in a manner inconsistent with rule or statute.  As 
we stated in Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1988), such 
power should “be exercised in a manner that is in harmony with the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.”  This means that “where the rules directly mandate a specific 
procedure to the exclusion of others, inherent authority is proscribed.” 
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Landau & Cleary, Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking, Inc., 867 F.2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir. 1989); 
Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
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specific triggers were selected because they reflect the circumstances courts 
have tended to recognize as placing one on notice of probable future 
litigation and because they offer a relative level of precision in fixing the 
time at which litigation will be deemed foreseeable.  Court orders and 
letters from adversaries will have fixed dates, while discovery can reveal 
when a party took steps to prepare for the pending action96 or had notice of 
the events and harm that form the basis for the pending action.  Whether the 
harm was sufficiently substantial to put the party on notice that litigation is 
likely is left to the judgment of the court.  This is ultimately a subjective 
determination, but one that courts already make pursuant to their inherent 
power over pre-litigation spoliation.97
The provision for pre-action court orders to preserve relevant material 
and information is new.  Currently, courts do not have the authority to issue 
orders to preserve information prior to the commencement of an action.
 
98  
Although courts have the authority to issue temporary restraining orders,99 
the proposed amendment does not seek to mirror the injunctive standard.  
Rather, the model is Rule 27, which permits courts to order depositions 
prior to the commencement of an action.100
 
 96. See, e.g., Wade v. Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 174, 194 (N.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“[T]he Court finds that Plaintiff had a duty to preserve all evidence regarding the RV 
[because, among other reasons,] . . . Plaintiff Motorists attempted to document the damage 
through photographs and reports [and] the person hired by Plaintiff Motorists to document 
the damage was an ‘expert’ fire investigator.”).  Looking at the dates of materials for which 
the spoliating party has asserted work-product protection would be informative of when 
litigation was anticipated, since the standard for being able to claim such protection is also 
connected with the anticipation of litigation. See AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 
Fed. Cl. 432, 445 (2007) (“It would be incongruous for the Court to find that Defendant had 
a duty to preserve documents for discovery because of impending litigation, yet could not 
assert the work product doctrine to protect documents prepared in anticipation of that 
litigation.”). 
  Under the proposal, no 
immediate or irreparable harm must be shown, nor must the petitioner 
demonstrate a likelihood of success.  Instead, once the court is satisfied that 
 97. See, e.g., Jain v. Memphis Shelby Cnty. Airport Auth., No. 08-2119-STA-dkv, 2010 
WL 711328, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 25, 2010) (holding that the discovery, during the 
completion of an incident report, of the serious nature of the victim’s injuries should have 
put the defendant on notice that litigation over the incident was likely); Wade, 686 F. Supp. 
2d at 194 (citing the fact that “the magnitude of the losses was significant” as a factor 
supporting the finding that the plaintiff had a duty to preserve). 
 98. See, for example, Keeling v. Damiter, No. 4:09-CV-0147, 2010 WL 3167525 (M.D. 
Pa. Aug. 10, 2010): 
[B]ecause spoliation motions necessarily involve an assessment of whether “the 
evidence destroyed or withheld was relevant to claims or defenses [in a lawsuit]; 
and . . . [whether] it was reasonably foreseeable that the evidence would later be 
discoverable [in that lawsuit],” such motions cannot be addressed in the abstract, 
but only can be considered in the context of a pending lawsuit.  In this case, 
Keeling has no litigation pending relating to these alleged incidents . . . .  
Moreover, these incidents which are separate in time and place from the claims set 
forth in the instant lawsuit, are not properly part of this lawsuit.  Therefore, his 
spoliation motion, which proceeds [sic] any lawsuit relating to these alleged 
incidents, is entirely premature. 
Id. at *2. 
 99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). 
 100. Id. 27. 
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issuing the order will prevent a failure or delay of justice, the order may be 
issued.101  The safeguards against unwarranted or overbroad preservation 
orders include a swift, post-order hearing of the party subject to the 
order,102 the requirement that the anticipated action actually be commenced 
within 60 days of the order before sanctions for violating the order may be 
imposed, and the requirement that the petitioner cover the costs, attorneys’ 
fees, and expenses incurred by the adversary in the event the threatened 
action is not filed.103
2. Scope 
 
Under the proposed amendment to Rule 37, the scope of the duty to 
preserve extends to all materials and information—within the “party’s 
possession, custody, or control”104—falling within the scope of potentially 
discoverable material as defined by Rule 26(b).105  This means, as indicated 
in the proposed amendment, material relevant to the subject matter of the 
prospective litigation would be subject to the duty to preserve.  Left to the 
judgment of preserving parties would be the extent to which material within 
one of the limits on discovery prescribed in Rule 26(b) must be preserved.  
For example, if it would be unduly burdensome to preserve electronically 
stored information because of the labor or expense associated with such an 
effort, parties need not ordinarily provide discovery of such information, 
although it is possible that the court will order discovery of the material for 
good cause shown.106  More generally, only reasonable preservation efforts 
need to be undertaken, meaning that preservation efforts whose costs are 
out of proportion with what is likely to be at stake in the dispute may be 
unwarranted as well.107
 
 101. See supra note 
  Thus, a preserving party might opt not to preserve 
such information, causing a dispute to arise regarding the alleged spoliator’s 
judgment on these matters.  In that event, the court would—under the 
92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(3)(B). 
 102. See supra note 92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(3)(C).  Pre-order notice is not 
chosen out of a concern that such notice might enable the prospective adversary to spoliate 
evidence prior to the issuance of the order.  However, were pre-order notice provided for in 
the rule, such notice itself would enable a prospective adversary to anticipate litigation, 
thereby subjecting it to the common law duty to preserve.  Thus, pre-order notice of a 
hearing on the order and the order itself would ultimately have the same effect.  As a result, a 
prompt post-order hearing is chosen as the best means of enabling the prospective adversary 
to challenge the order without pre-empting the effect of an order with advance notice.  
Further, the prospective adversary will be entitled to an additional hearing prior to any 
imposition of sanctions. 
 103. See supra note 92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(3)(D). 
 104. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1). 
 105. See supra note 92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(1)(A). 
 106. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 107. See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 533 (D. Md. 
2010) (concluding, in light of the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2), that “assessment of 
reasonableness and proportionality should be at the forefront of all inquiries into whether a 
party has fulfilled its duty to preserve relevant evidence”); Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. 
Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Whether preservation or discovery 
conduct is acceptable in a case depends on what is reasonable, and that in turn depends on 
whether what was done—or not done—was proportional to that case . . . .”). 
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proposed rule—be able to resolve the dispute at the hearing on the motion 
for sanctions, where the court could consider whether the loss of the 
information was “substantially justified.”108  Finally, although information 
pertaining to the subject matter of the prospective action falls within the 
duty to preserve, the failure to preserve such material becomes sanctionable 
only in the event that the court issues an order109 broadening discovery to 
the subject matter of the dispute under Rule 26(b)(1).110
Connecting the scope of the obligation with Rule 26(b) should protect 
against overly broad preservation requests by prospective plaintiffs, as 
prospective adverse parties will be able to evaluate such requests against the 
relevant-to-the-subject-matter standard.  Further, limiting the ability of 
litigant preservation requests to trigger a preservation obligation to a sixty-
day period should offer some protection against preservation requests that 
are not promptly followed up by the actual filing of the threatened action.  
Otherwise, prospective litigants might be able to get prospective adverse 
parties to preserve—for an open-ended period of time—material that turns 
out to be relevant only to an action that the requesting party ultimately 
never files or files too belatedly. 
 
3.  Culpability 
The proposed amendment simplifies the culpability analysis by requiring 
fault on the part of the spoliator, but opting against connecting the various 
degrees of culpability with a determination of the availability and propriety 
of any given sanction as some courts have done.111  Unless the spoliation 
was harmless or excusable, all levels of culpability will render the spoliator 
sanctionable at the court’s discretion.112
 
 108. See supra note 
  This feature reflects the view that 
the appropriate remedy has more to do with the degree of harm, or 
prejudice, to the innocent party than with the level of culpability of the 
92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(4).  Certainly, producing parties 
bear some risk of exposing themselves to sanctions if they are mistaken in their judgment 
that they are “substantially justified” in having failed to preserve certain material because of 
the associated cost or burden.  When pre-litigation preservation orders are issued, courts 
should be sensitive to such issues, and producing parties should be able to raise these 
concerns in the context of the post-issuance hearing that is available under the proposed rule.  
However, when the pre-litigation preservation obligation arises outside of an order, 
preserving parties’ concerns over the scope and burden of the obligation would have to be 
resolved either in the context of the hearing on a motion for sanctions, or a prompt motion 
for a protective order once litigation ensues.  Admittedly, however, in the meantime, parties 
under the duty to preserve would be advised to preserve information that might ultimately be 
protected from discovery lest they are later held to have not been justified in its spoliation. 
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“For good cause, the court may order discovery of any 
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.”). 
 110. See supra note 92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(1)(A). 
 111. See, e.g., Managed Care Solutions, Inc. v. Essent Healthcare, Inc., No. 09-60351-
CIV, 2010 WL 3368654, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2010) (“[A] party’s failure to preserve 
evidence rises to the level of sanctionable spoliation only where the absences [sic] of that 
evidence is predicated on bad faith, such as where a party purposely loses or destroys 
relevant evidence.” (quoting Walter v. Carnival Corp., No. 09-20962-CIV, 2010 WL 
2927962, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 112. See supra note 92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(4). 
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spoliator.  Degrees of culpability can relate to the court’s determination of 
whether the lost information would have been helpful to the innocent 
party’s case, as is currently the approach in many courts.  But as to the issue 
of whether vel non sanctions are appropriate for the loss of materials or 
information, fault of any kind will suffice under the proposed rule. 
4.  Prejudice & Relevance 
As discussed previously, courts have generally held that sanctions for 
spoliation are only appropriate if the lost information would have aided the 
innocent party in establishing a claim or defense.113  When lost information 
is relevant in this more narrow sense, its loss is prejudicial to the innocent 
party.  Establishing relevance and prejudice of this kind typically is the 
burden of the innocent party, although some courts have presumed 
relevance in the face of intentional spoliation.114  Judge Scheindlin in 
Pension Committee indicated that gross negligence would also be a sound 
basis for presuming relevance and prejudice,115 while Judge Rosenthal in 
Rimkus made clear that the Fifth Circuit had not endorsed such a 
presumption under any circumstances.116
The proposed rule amendment takes an entirely distinct approach:  once 
culpability of any kind is established on the part of the producing party, 





 113. See Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 
685 F. Supp. 2d. 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“It is not enough for the innocent party to show 
that the destroyed evidence would have been responsive to a document request.  The 
innocent party must also show that the evidence would have been helpful in proving its 
claims or defenses . . . .”); Sampson v. City of Cambridge, 251 F.R.D. 172, 180 (D. Md. 
2008) (“‘The burden is on the aggrieved party to establish a reasonable possibility, based on 
concrete evidence rather than a fertile imagination, that access to the lost material would 
have produced evidence favorable to his cause.’” (quoting Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando 
Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 104 (D. Colo. 1996))). 
  This approach acknowledges the difficulty an 
innocent party faces when attempting to establish the substance of missing 
information it has not had the opportunity to review.  Although it is 
certainly possible for the innocent party to meet such a burden under the 
right circumstances, there will clearly be instances when expecting the 
innocent party to establish the nature of missing information will be too 
much to ask.  As Judge Scheindlin has acknowledged, placing too heavy a 
 114. See, e.g., Sampson, 251 F.R.D. at 179 (“A failure to preserve documents in bad faith, 
such as intentional or willful conduct, alone establishes that the destroyed documents were 
relevant.” (citing Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 101 (D. 
Md. 2003))). 
 115. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (“Relevance and prejudice may be presumed 
when the spoliating party acted in bad faith or in a grossly negligent manner.”). 
 116. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 617–18 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (“The Fifth Circuit has not explicitly addressed whether even bad-faith 
destruction of evidence allows a court to presume that the destroyed evidence was relevant 
or its loss prejudicial.”). 
 117. See supra note 92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(4). 
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burden on innocent parties to demonstrate prejudice “would . . . allow 
parties who have . . . destroyed evidence to profit from that destruction.”118
That said, Judge Scheindlin also cautioned that permitting a presumption 
of prejudice to exist in all cases of spoliation would turn litigation into a 
“gotcha” game where the “the incentive to find such error and capitalize on 
it would be overwhelming.”
 
119  This might be true if no finding of fault of 
any kind were required.  But inadvertent or excusable loss of evidence will 
not be subject to sanctions under the proposed rule.  Further, the rule simply 
establishes a rebuttable presumption of prejudice rather than conclusively 
establishing it, affording the spoliator the opportunity to demonstrate that 
the loss of information was harmless.120
Finally, because of the connection between prejudice and fixing 
appropriate sanctions, there is little to no risk that spoliators will be subject 
to penalties of any kind, let alone severe sanctions, if the court has 
determined that the resulting prejudice was slight or nonexistent.  In sum, 
spoliating parties shown to have acted culpably—even if only negligently—
are at fault and should bear the burden of showing that the material or 
information they lost was not relevant to a claim or defense of their 
adversary.  Creating such a presumption even in the case of negligent 
spoliation will strengthen prospective litigants’ incentive to engage in a 
thorough preservation effort that will protect them from a finding of fault 
should some loss of evidence occur. 
  Because the spoliator is in a better 
position to know the substance of the missing information, it makes sense 
for that party to bear the initial burden of showing its irrelevance. 
5.  Appropriate Sanctions 
Under the proposed amendment, courts would impose sanctions 
consistent with the manner in which they have heretofore imposed 
sanctions under Rules 26(g) and 37.  The proposed amendment to Rule 
37(e) does not connect the appropriate sanction with culpability but simply 
requires fault and prejudice.  Courts are then free to craft the appropriate 
remedy or sanction based on the degree of prejudice and on whether such 
prejudice can somehow be lessened or eliminated by the remedy.  For 
example, in Multiservice Joint Venture, LLC v. United States121 the court 
was unable to establish the content of missing notes made by a witness for 
the spoliating party, making the degree of prejudice unclear.122
 
 118. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (alteration in original) (quoting Residential 
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
  Rather than 
presume the worst, the court declined to give an adverse inference 
instruction, opting instead to preclude the spoliating party from calling that 
witness to testify at trial as the best means of making the innocent party 
 119. Id. 
 120. See supra note 92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(4). 
 121. 85 Fed. Cl. 106 (2008). 
 122. Id. at 114. 
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whole.123  On the other hand, when prejudice to the innocent party is 
substantial and cannot be remedied by less drastic sanctions, dismissal of 
the action would be an available and potentially appropriate response.124
Ultimately, the court should fashion a sanction that: 
  A 
district judge in Montana aptly summarized some of the considerations 
courts use to determine an appropriate sanction as follows: 
(1) sufficiently penalizes the spoliating party[,] 
(2) has a sufficient deterrent value to the immediate spoliating party and 
future litigants[,] 
(3) sufficiently cures any prejudice to an affected party by restoring that 
party to the position it would have been in but for the spoliation[,] 
(4) sufficiently restores the accuracy of the fact-finding process[,] and 
(5) places the risk of an erroneous judgment on the spoliating party.125
These considerations would not change under the proposed rule, nor 
would the scope of a court’s discretion in fashioning appropriate relief.  The 
bulk of what the rule accomplishes is the standardization of the duty to 
preserve and of the prerequisites to the availability of sanctions for 
spoliation.  The range of available sanctions and their propriety under the 
circumstances remains within the discretion of the judge on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
D.  The Validity of the Proposed Amendments to Rules 
As a final note, it is worth mentioning that the current regime of 
regulating pre-litigation preservation obligations via the inherent power of 
the courts raises issues under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,126 which held that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the 
law of the State.”127
 
 123. See id. (“Without knowing exactly what Mr. Tolson’s notations may have said, it is 
difficult to define what an adverse inference should be. . . . Rather than attempting to define 
at trial whether Mr. Tolson might be testifying in support of Plaintiff’s claim or in defense to 
Defendant’s counterclaim, the simpler and more rational approach is to rule that Mr. Tolson 
will not testify . . . .”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) (permitting courts to 
“prohibit[] the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, 
or from introducing designated matters in evidence”); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 
462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“[A] court can exclude witness testimony 
proffered by the party responsible for destroying the evidence and based on the destroyed 
evidence.”). 
  Although the idea that Erie constrains the ability of 
 124. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v) (permitting dismissal of “the action in whole or in 
part”); Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[D]ismissal may 
be necessary if the prejudice to the [nonspoiling party] is extraordinary, denying it the ability 
to adequately defend [or prosecute] its case.”). 
 125. Peschel v. City of Missoula, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143 (D. Mont. 2009) (citations 
omitted). 
 126. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 127. Id. at 78.  These issues were highlighted in a recent report. See ADVISORY GRP. TO 
THE N.Y. STATE-FED. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, HARMONIZING THE PRE-LITIGATION OBLIGATION 
TO PRESERVE ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION IN NEW YORK STATE AND FEDERAL 
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federal courts to regulate pre-litigation preservation obligations has not 
been embraced by the federal courts,128 the promulgation of a Federal Rule 
on the subject would cause this Erie question to be supplanted129 by the 
question central in Hanna v. Plumer130—whether such a Federal Rule 
would be consistent with the limits of the Rules Enabling Act.131  That 
statute provides that federal rules may not “abridge, enlarge, or modify” 
substantive rights.132
As Justice Scalia recently emphasized in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.:
  Do the rule amendments proposed above run afoul of 
that restriction? 
133
The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights; most 
procedural rules do.  What matters is what the rule itself regulates:  If it 
governs only “the manner and the means” by which the litigants’ rights 
are “enforced,” it is valid; if it alters “the rules of decision by which [the] 
court will adjudicate [those] rights,” it is not.
 
134
Applying that test to a rule permitting the imposition of sanctions for 
spoliation of discoverable material, such a rule seems valid.  The proposed 
amendments do not alter the rules of decision by which litigants’ rights will 
be adjudicated.  Rather, the revised rule as proposed regulates how rights 
are enforced in litigation:  it permits the imposition of sanctions that may 
alter the parties’ respective evidentiary burdens or their opportunity to 
present proof in support of their case; shifts the responsibility for the costs 
of discovery from one party to another; instructs the jury to regard 
evidentiary matters in a certain light; or—in extreme cases—permits the 
dismissal of an action or entry of judgment on a claim due to the impact that 
spoliation has on a court’s ability to provide a fair process for innocent 
 
 
COURTS 31 (2010) (“The Supreme Court has not rendered an opinion regarding the 
application of Erie to the pre-litigation duty to preserve ESI, and there appears to be some 
disagreement among the federal circuits on that issue.”). 
 128. Compare Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 590 (“[F]ederal law of spoliation applies because, as 
we note below, the power to sanction for spoliation derives from the inherent power of the 
court, not substantive law.”), with Ward v. Tex. Steak Ltd., No. Civ. 7:03 CV 00596, 2004 
WL 1280776, at *2 (W.D. Va. May 27, 2004) (“Recognizing that it is a court of limited 
jurisdiction, this court concludes that when spoliation of evidence does not occur in the 
course of pending federal litigation, a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction in which 
the rule of decision is supplied by state law is required to apply those spoliation principles 
the forum state would apply.”(citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 
160, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“[W]e can only conclude that the issue of State Farm’s pre-suit 
duty to preserve material evidence is substantive and, as such, Illinois law governs.”))). 
 129. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1442 (2010) (“Erie involved the constitutional power of federal courts to supplant state law 
with judge-made rules.” (emphasis added)). 
 130. 380 U.S. 460 (1965); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (“[Erie] is not the test for 
either the constitutionality or the statutory validity of a Federal Rule of Procedure.”). 
 131. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
 132. Id. 
 133. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 134. Id. at 1442 (citing Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946)). 
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parties.135  Notably and deliberately absent from the list of permissible 
sanctions in the proposed amendment to Rule 37(e) is a contempt of court 
finding under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vii), which—if included in the rule—might 
get it nearer to imposing substantive penalties for primary, pre-litigation 
conduct and make the Hanna question a closer matter.  But as it stands, the 
proposal only empowers courts to alter the “manner and means” by which 
litigants’ rights are enforced in court, keeping the amendments within the 




Revising the Federal Rules in the way proposed above certainly will 
yield more predictability in the area of pre-litigation preservation duties and 
spoliation sanctions.  Clear and discrete categories defining when the duty 
to preserve is triggered will help make the determination surrounding the 
anticipation of litigation less subjective and more consistently assessed 
across jurisdictions.  Aligning the Rule 26 scope of discovery—including 
its attendant limitations—with the scope of the preservation obligation 
strikes the right balance between retaining all relevant information and 
subjecting parties only to proportionate, not unduly burdensome 
preservation obligations, and does so in a way that provides clearer and 
more consistent guidance than would a distinctive standard.  Simplifying 
the culpability analysis to fault or no fault, with a concomitant elimination 
of the link between degrees of culpability and the selection of proper 
 
 135. See supra note 92 and accompanying text, at 37(e)(4) (permitting cost shifting and 
special jury instructions as sanctions and incorporating the sanctions indicated in Federal 
Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi)). 
 136. I will note here my view that even when pre-litigation preservation obligations are 
regulated pursuant to the inherent authority of the federal courts, the Erie principle is not 
violated.  The judge-made rules that currently govern preservation obligations and sanctions 
for the breach thereof primarily impact the process by which litigants’ rights are adjudicated.  
It is not likely that prospective litigants would choose state versus federal court based solely 
on differences in their respective attendant preservation obligations, nor would differential 
litigant access to state and federal court and their differing preservation obligations result in 
the inequitable administration of the laws. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (“The 
‘outcome-determination’ test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of 
the Erie rule:  discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”).  The variation between litigation in the two systems resulting 
from differing preservation obligations would not be sufficiently “substantial” to cause 
concern under Erie. Id. (“Not only are nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations not likely to raise 
the sort of equal protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie; they are also unlikely 
to influence the choice of a forum.”).  However, even if one might disagree as to whether 
either of Erie’s “twin aims” is implicated under an inherent-power based regulation of pre-
litigation preservation obligations, the federal courts have a substantial countervailing 
interest in regulating abuse of the judicial process and in maintaining the ability to provide a 
fair adjudication of the cases before them. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 
U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (“In [Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 
(1958)] the Court said that the Guaranty Trust ‘outcome-determination’ test was an 
insufficient guide in cases presenting countervailing federal interests.”).  Thus, federal courts 
should be seen as free to follow judge-made rules governing sanctions for failures to 
preserve certain material in the face of reasonably foreseeable litigation. 
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sanctions removes much of the source of variability among jurisdictions in 
these two areas.  Finally, presuming prejudice in the face of a culpable loss 
of relevant information properly places the burden of demonstrating the 
harmlessness of the loss on the producing party, who is the party 
responsible for the problem and the party in the best position to guard 
against spoliation. 
All of these simplifying reforms offer greater consistency and 
predictability without inviting excessive or reflexive sanctions motions or 
depriving judges of the discretion they have to tailor appropriate remedies 
based on the circumstances of each case.  Indeed, minimizing the role that 
levels of culpability have heretofore played in the determination of proper 
sanctions will focus courts on the consideration that should matter most to 
that decision:  the degree of harm to the innocent party, which includes an 
assessment of the probative value of the missing information and the 
availability of alternate methods of offering similar proof.  The prejudice 
analysis will also serve as a bulwark against frivolous or strategic motions 
over de minimis or technical violations of the rule, provided that judges 
take the analysis seriously.  Hopefully, the federal rulemakers will seize the 
opportunity to reform the rules to address pre-litigation preservation and 
spoliation, as so many have called for,137
 
 rather than continuing to leave the 
matter in the hands of courts exercising their inherent authority in varying 
ways across jurisdictions.  Prospective litigants of all stripes deserve the 
greater clarity and predictability that would ensue. 
 
 137. See, e.g., ALLMAN, supra note 90, at 22 (“A uniform federal preservation rule—
provided it is practical and effective—might help unlock the full potential of voluntary 
agreements and, over time, reduce the burden of collateral disputes on both the judiciary and 
the litigants.”); CIVIL LITIG. CONFERENCE E-DISCOVERY PANEL, ELEMENTS OF A 
PRESERVATION RULE 1 (“The E-Discovery Panel . . . holds the consensus view that a rule 
addressing preservation (spoliation) would be a valuable addition to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.”). 
